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By M. A. Gareyev

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DEFENSE OF THE HOMELAND: SOVIET MILITARY SCIENCE

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DEFENSE OF THE HOMELAND: SOVIET MILITARY SCIENCE

Brief Annotation

[Text] In light of the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress, the pamphlet examines the place and role of military theory and primarily military science in the general system of knowledge dealing with war and the army, in strengthening the country's defense and the combat readiness of the Armed Forces, its subject and modern structure and relationship with the military aspects of other sciences.

The pamphlet is designed for lecturers, military instructors and propagandists of military knowledge as well as a broad range of readers.

The 27th CPSU Congress on New Thinking on the Questions of War, Peace and the Strengthening of Country Defense

The documents worked out by the 27th CPSU Congress reflect a turning point in the development of both our country and the world as a whole and they provide an answer to the most pertinent questions of modern times. The most important of these are: accelerating the country's socioeconomic development and strengthening peace in the world as the most important conditions for carrying out all the tasks of communist construction.

The congress documents provide a profound analysis of the questions of war and peace as the most acute problem confronting mankind.

As was pointed out in the Political Report to the Congress, "...the 20th Century is drawing to a close in world policy under the question: Can mankind escape from nuclear danger or will a policy of confrontation gain the upper hand, leading to a greater probability of a nuclear conflict?"(1) Changes in contemporary world development have been so profound and significant that they require a completely new approach to the problems of war and peace and a fundamental change in the thinking on these questions.

The materials of the 27th Party Congress provide further development for the Marxist-Leninist teachings concerning war and the army.

First of all, the causes and sources of the military danger have been profoundly analyzed and established taking into account the particular features of the modern era.

Historical experience and contemporary life by constantly new facts convince one of the soundness of the [concept of the] aggressive essence of imperialism described by V.I. Lenin and they confirm Lenin's thesis that "...politically, imperialism is generally a drive for violence and for reaction."(2)

The CPSU Program emphasizes that "imperialism has been guilty of two world wars which have carried away many scores of millions of lives. It is now creating the threat of a third world war."(3) Imperialism can maneuver, it can adapt to new conditions and to a certain degree take into account the existing realities. But by its nature it cannot make peace and security of peoples the end goal of its policy. Capitalism has viewed the rise of socialism and the development of the Soviet state as an error of history which should be rectified. The foreign intervention during the period of the Civil War, the arming of Nazi Germany and its attack on the USSR in 1941 and the Cold War after the war—all these are attempts to put an end to the Soviet state which was born by Great October 70 years ago. The chief goal of U.S. military doctrine has been proclaimed to be the destruction of the world socialist system and the establishing of U.S. hegemony. This was proclaimed in 1945 in Truman's message to Congress when he asserted that "victory in World War II confronted the American people with the constant and burning necessity of world leadership." In subsequent years this notion has been confirmed by all presidents in different forms. Imperialism has always endeavored and will endeavor to seek social revenge, to alter the existing balance of forces and the unfavorable course of events for it, to contain and ultimately, as Reagan has stated, to eliminate socialism as a social system. The threat of war derives primarily from U.S. imperialism which has acted as the citadel of international reaction.

Why in recent years have there been such an abrupt about-face and increasing aggressiveness in U.S. policy?

It is paradoxical but also a fact that the more the United States has increased its military might in postwar years, the more it has suffered defeats and setbacks in carrying out its aggressive policy. One has merely to remember the war in Vietnam, the loss of such an important base of support as Iran, and the unsuccessful overt and covert interventionist actions against Cuba, Nicaragua, Angola, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Syria, Libya and in many other regions. All of this has been utilized by the reactionary forces for arousing among broad strata of the population feelings of national vulnerability and an activating of nationalistic attitudes.

The U.S. positions have been weakened not only throughout the world but also among the capitalist countries.

As a whole, the general crisis of capitalism is deepening. The United States, like the other leading capitalist countries, are experiencing serious difficulties, the economic and financial crisis is intensifying and unemployment is growing. As historical experience indicates, the imperialists have always sought a way out of a crisis in the militarizing of society, in an arms race and in military provocations.

Scientific-technical progress has given rise among the most reactionary U.S. circles to hopes of the possibility of a new technological breakthrough and the achieving of decisive military-technical superiority. Certainly after World War II the development of the atomic bomb by the Americans was one of the instigators of the Cold War. Contradictions are growing between the imperialist states and the peoples carrying out the national liberation struggle.

The group of contradictions in the modern world which is most important from the viewpoint of the fate of mankind involves the relations between the states of the two systems, the two formations. However, the task of the survival of mankind in the nuclear age has risen above all the contradictions and differences between the social systems and states. Moreover, the threat of a nuclear war is rooted not in the contradictions between the two social systems but rather in the aggressive policy of imperialism.

The Political Report to the 27th CPSU Congress pointed out that "imperialism is being driven also by its own inner springs, its own socioeconomic essence to shifting the competition between the two systems to a language of military confrontation. Due to its own social nature, imperialism constantly generates an aggressive, adventurous policy."(4)

All these causes and objective factors are capable of causing a danger for the outbreak of war or military conflicts which at any minute can make a most unexpected abrupt change which would closely involve the state interests of the USSR and the other socialist countries. Under certain conditions, even military parity can be incapable of halting the aggressor. Due to the adventurism of its policy, imperialism is capable of resorting to weapons, counting on various existing or imaginary advantages. For this reason at the present stage and in the foreseeable future, the threat of war will objectively remain. The growth of this threat can be halted and pushed back, but as long as imperialism exists, it cannot be completely eliminated.

The development of the class struggle on the world scene confirms the law established by V.I. Lenin: "...the force of the revolution, the force of pressure, the energy, determination and triumph of its victory at the same time intensify the force of resistance from the bourgeoisie. The more we are victorious, the more the capitalist exploiters learn to join forces and go over to a more decisive offensive."(5)

However, under present-day conditions there is no fatal inevitability of a war. The CPSU Program draws the definite conclusion that it is possible to prevent a war and save mankind from disaster. The aggressive policy of imperialism opposes the potential of peace. In the first place, this is the peace-loving policy of the USSR and the other socialist countries as well as their growing economic and defense might. Of particular importance is

the achievement of military-strategic parity between the USSR and United States, the Warsaw Pact and NATO organizations. Secondly, this is a policy of a predominant majority of the Asian, African and Latin American states which are vitally interested in preserving peace. Thirdly, this is the antiwar movement of the masses of people on all continents of the world, including in the capitalist countries. Fourthly, the position of many realistically thinking political figures in the capitalist states is also of major importance.

In terms of its sociopolitical class essence, a war, including one carried out by the imperialists, and the preparations for this remain a continuation of their aggressive policy. But it is perfectly apparent that a war under present-day conditions ceases to be a rational means for carrying out political tasks, for a nuclear war is fraught with catastrophic consequences for all mankind. In the political arsenal there are sufficient means making it possible to resolve international problems without resorting to armed violence.

The U.S. leaders have also repeatedly admitted in public that a modern nuclear missile war cannot be won.

The Joint Soviet-American Declaration on the Results of the Geneva Summit in November 1985 states that a nuclear war should never be started and there cannot be any victors in it.

But what then are the imperialist circles of the United States and the other NATO countries hoping for, in carrying out an aggressive policy and a course of preparing for war?

By the arms race they are endeavoring to stimulate their economy and undermine the economy of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, to break the military-technical parity, to achieve decisive superiority and apply pressure to other countries, and to impose their will. Plans are being hatched to achieve the political aims of a war employing only conventional weapons, although it is apparent that in such a war the threat of employing nuclear weapons will exist constantly and neither of the sides possessing nuclear weapons will permit its defeat in a conventional war without having resorted to nuclear weapons.

In its military preparations the Pentagon has still not completely abandoned the illusions of the possibility of winning a nuclear war. U.S. military doctrine up to now has been based on the launching of a pre-emptive nuclear strike. Thus, in the 1980 Presidential Directive No. 59, the aim of the United States was formulated in a perfectly definite manner: the destruction of socialism as a sociopolitical system, the use of nuclear weapons first, the achievement of superiority over the USSR in a nuclear war and its conclusion under conditions advantageous for the United States.

The "Directive Instructions on the Development of the U.S. Armed Forces for 1984-1988" states directly that in a nuclear war "the United States should gain the upper hand and be able to quickly force the USSR to break off military operations under U.S. conditions." Thus, the wagering on a victory in a nuclear war and the establishment of world domination comprise the basis of U.S. military doctrine.

The achieving of this goal is the aim of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative announced by the U.S. president on 23 March 1983 and which is designed not only to establish a wide-scale antimissile defense with space-based elements ensuring, in the Pentagon's plans, the launching of a first nuclear strike with impunity, but also moving into space-strike weapons which can hit objectives on the earth. Convinced that the United States could not achieve decisive superiority by improving its strategic offensive forces, the military-political leadership decided to shift the arms race into space.

The arms race is also viewed as one of the catalysts of new technological development. In particular, under the SDI Program, the United States is viewed as a powerful locomotive which, in the American opinion, will rescue the defense industry from stagnation and degradation, providing its development and superprofits not only up to the end of the current century but also in the 21st Century. The program is viewed as a major organizational and technical measure to achieve military superiority over the USSR and one which integrates a number of new technological areas involved with discoveries in the area of laser technology, nuclear power, beam weapons, optics, electronics, supercomputers, sensors and communications equipment which will inevitably be employed in developing a new generation of weapons and combat command and control systems.

The recent attempts to prove that after an exchange of nuclear strikes by the sides a "nuclear winter" will not inevitably follow, are not accidental either. Immediately after the publication of research results by a group of American scientists in 1983, where it was persuasively shown that the use of even a small portion of the stockpiled nuclear warheads would lead to catastrophic consequences, the Pentagon immediately ordered the major scientific centers involved in atmospheric research to reverify the data given in the hypothesis of the scientists concerning a "nuclear winter." Millions of dollars were spent on the rechecking, new computers and hundreds of scientists were put to work but, in essence, they could not give any arguments against the hypothesis of a "nuclear winter." However, the conclusion was drawn to the Pentagon's liking that "the end of mankind is not a likely consequence of a 'nuclear winter'."

The United States is intensely developing and is beginning to deploy qualitatively new strategic weapons systems and is putting into service the MX intercontinental ballistic missiles (with 10 warheads each with a power of

600 kilotons). They are a particularly dangerous destabilizing weapon. A new generation of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles is being developed — the Midgetman ICBM (500 launchers). The new missile-carrying bomber, the B-1B, is being introduced into strategic aviation and these are armed with long-range cruise missiles; stealth ATB bombers are also being developed. Flight testing is being conducted on the new Trident-2 ballistic missile for nuclear submarines. With the implementation of these programs, U.S. strategic nuclear capability will grow significantly (from 14,000 to 20,000 nuclear warheads) by the beginning of the 1990s.

They are also accelerating the development and outfitting of the NATO Armed Forces with conventional types of weapons. The ground forces are to receive 7,500 new M1 Abrams tanks, up to 7,000 Bradley combat vehicles, new types of self-propelled, armored artillery and anti-tank weapons.

Over the next 5 years (1988-1992), tactical aviation will undergo further development (there are plans to deliver over 1,000 modernized F-15 and F-16 aircraft as well as to develop a fundamentally new all-weather fighter).

Particular importance is attributed to the development of naval forces. Some 175 new ships of the basic classes have been commissioned (by the start of the 1990s the number of combat ships should rise up to 600 units). Surface vessels and submarines are being armed with the long-range Tomahawk cruise missiles.

All the armed services are being intensely armed with high-precision ammunition, new reconnaissance devices, electronic warfare and automated command and control.

During exercises they work on the methods of surprise attack and conducting airland operations with the launching of thrusts to the entire depth of the configuration of the Warsaw Pact Armed Forces, including against the second echelons, reserves and lines of communications. All these military preparations combined with ideological expansion and the indoctrination of the population of the Western Countries in an anti-Soviet spirit, are aimed against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, this "Evil Empire." In June 1987, President Reagan, speaking in West Berlin in front of the Brandenburg Gate in a provocative speech, openly called for the changing of frontiers in Europe, and the destruction of the frontier structures of East Germany. In Nuremberg, during a meeting of the so-called "Sudeten German Bund" there were appeals to revise the postwar frontiers. On the central square of Tokyo, parades were held by fascist youth with banners: "We will take back the Kurils, Sakhalin is ours" and so forth.

The United States and certain other NATO states have been providing financial and military aid to the counter-revolutionary forces of Afghanistan, Nicaragua and also a number of African countries, where the national liberation struggle against the reactionary regimes has not abated.

The imperialist reactionary circles, regardless of a number of setbacks, have not abandoned the attempts to destabilize the situation in the socialist countries. In their plans of ideological subversion, an important place has been given to discrediting socialist ideals and to weakening the combat capability of the Soviet Armed Forces and the armies of the other socialist countries by spreading the ideas of pacifism.

Here all of this has been carried out under the cover of false demagogic assertions about the "Soviet military threat." V.I. Lenin even in 1919 spoke about those stupid persons "who shout about Red militarism; these," he emphasized, "are political swindlers who pretend that they believe this stupidity...." (6)

One of the instigators of the Cold War, John Dulles, said: "In order to force the country to assume the burden required by the maintenance of large armed forces, it is essential to establish an emotional atmosphere close to military hysteria. It is essential to evoke fear of outside danger." Consequently, the "secret" is that there must be a political justification for the ongoing arms race and for this reason the military-industrial magnates require the intensification of aggressive policy and the constant use of threats and adventures which have the potential of being turned into a war.

The Essence of the New Thinking on the Questions of War and the Defense of the Country

In opposition to the aggressive policy of the imperialist states, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries have carried out a consistent, Leninist peace-loving policy.

Socialism unconditionally rejects war as a means of resolving international, political, economic and ideological contradictions. Adherence to the cause of peace and peaceful collaboration is determined by the essence and nature of a socialist society in which there are and cannot be any forces interested in an aggressive policy and in a war.

The foreign policy line of the fraternal countries, as expressed in the decisions of their ruling party congresses, is aimed at building a secure world, a world with a minimal level of armed forces and weapons necessary solely for defense. The main historical purpose of the Warsaw Pact is to ensure the security of the peoples in the socialist countries and support peace in Europe.

Soviet military theory proceeds from the view that no matter how great the threat to peace arising from the policy of the aggressive circles of imperialism — primarily American [ones], under present-day conditions it is possible to prevent a war.

In the nuclear-space age it is impossible to ensure the security of an individual state or group of states merely by military-technical means, and political means and actions initiated by the international community are assuming ever-great significance.

An all-encompassing international security system can be achieved only by an entire range of measures in the military, political, economic and humanitarian areas. The chief ones here are: the rejection of war; a reduction and then complete elimination of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction; the abandoning of the placement of weapons in space; the reduction of the levels of the military capabilities of the sides to the limits essential for defense; the settling of international problems by political means; respect for the sovereignty and noninterference into the internal affairs of one another, the development of equal and reciprocally advantageous economic and cultural ties between different countries.

The Soviet Union, like the other socialist countries, is ready to participate in implementing all international measures aimed at ensuring peace and security.

At a session of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact States held in Berlin in May 1987, the question was firmly recognized that an historic moment had arrived when it was essential to overcome the concept of nuclear deterrence according to which nuclear weapons are a guarantee for the security of states. The socialist countries proposed to the NATO states that the use of military force be abandoned on a reciprocal basis and that they assume the obligation of maintaining peaceful relations between themselves. Proceeding from this the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact states was adjusted. Reaffirmed were the proposals of the USSR and the other socialist countries aimed at the complete elimination of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction, the reduction of weapons, and a radical reduction in the strategic offensive armed forces and conventional weaponry of the USSR and United States with a simultaneous strengthening of the provisions of the ABM Treaty, the abandoning of the deployment of weapons in space, the banning of chemical weapons and nuclear testing, the breaking up of military blocs, the elimination of foreign bases and the withdrawal of troops stationed at them to within national frontiers.

Unjust, predatory wars are alien to the socialist countries. They do not have territorial claims on any state and from the viewpoint of domestic conditions do not require armies.

But the socialist commonwealth countries have expressed serious concern for the tense situation in the world, arising as a result of the acceleration of military preparations by the United States and the other NATO countries.

Under conditions when the real military threat deriving from imperialism has not declined and the peace-loving proposals of the socialist countries are rejected, the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact states have been forced to strengthen their defense capability and increase the combat readiness of the armed forces in order to ensure a dependable defense for the achievements of socialism.

The CPSU Program states: **"The CPSU views the defense of the socialist fatherland, the strengthening of the defense of the country and ensuring state security as one of the most important functions of the Soviet state."**(7)

The decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress emphasize that the greatest possible rise in the combat readiness of the Armed Forces, the indoctrination of the Army and Navy personnel and all Soviet people in a spirit of vigilance and a constant readiness to defend the great victories of socialism should in the future remain one of the most important tasks for the party, state and the people.

The basic content and direction of the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact states conform fully to the goals of the peace-loving policy of the socialist commonwealth countries and to the interests of ensuring their security.

This doctrine is determined by the peace-loving policy of the communist and worker parties and the governments of these countries, by the international agreements concluded between them, and by the jointly elaborated and coordinated concepts in the defense area. This doctrine is a system of fundamental views concerning the prevention of war, military organizational development, the preparation of the countries and their armed forces to repel aggression and the methods of conducting armed combat for the defense of socialism.

From this definition it can be seen that the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact is based upon views directed not toward the preparation and unleashing of a war but rather toward the prevention of war, and carrying out measures of response to rebuff possible aggression, and on acts which could prevent the turning of military operations involving conventional weapons into a nuclear war, if the imperialists start these.

The political aspect of socialist military doctrine derives from the policy of peaceful coexistence, the prevention of war and Lenin's thesis that "...any revolution is worth something only when it is able to defend itself...."(8)

In scientific terms, socialist military doctrine is based upon the Marxist-Leninist teachings concerning war and the army, on socialist military doctrine and the entire system of military theoretical knowledge. It takes into account the national tasks and particular features in the military organizational development of each of the allied countries as well as the international defensive tasks of the Warsaw Pact.

The military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact states has a strictly defensive nature consisting in the fact that defensive measures and the military organizational development in the allied countries are carried out within the limits of military parity and the necessary sufficiency, and are designed exclusively for retaliatory actions and defense against possible aggression. The very establishing of the military-political defensive alliance of the socialist states was caused by the need to offset the aggressive aspirations of imperialism.

At a session of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact States held at the end of May 1987, it was reemphasized that under no circumstances would they start a war—either nuclear or conventional—against any state, be it in Europe or any other region of the world, if they themselves were not the object of attack. The socialist commonwealth countries stated that they do not have territorial claims on any state in Europe or outside Europe. They do not consider either any state or any people as their enemy. The Warsaw Pact countries with all countries of the world, without exception, have established relations on the basis of mutual consideration of the interests of security and peaceful coexistence. They fully support the unilateral obligation of the Soviet Union not to be the first to employ nuclear weapons. These ideas are an obligatory part in the organizational development and training of the allied armies, including the questions of defensive planning, the preparation and training of the headquarters bodies and troops (naval forces) as well as the methods of conducting armed combat.

The achievement of the lowest level of military confrontation between the sides would correspond to the interests of the Warsaw Pact states. The maintenance of military parity at its lowest possible level is a most important condition for ensuring security and peace. Truly equal security in our age is guaranteed not by a high [level], but rather by the lowest level of the strategic balance. The continuation of the nuclear arms race could lead to a situation where even parity ceases to be a factor of military-political restraint.

But in so far as the level of these limits is restricted by the military preparations of the imperialist states, then the defensive strength of the socialist countries should be organized taking into account that the relationship between the USSR and United States, the Warsaw Pact and NATO, should be equal and the same, their security should be reciprocal, while in international terms as a whole, it should be universal. The socialist countries do not claim greater security but likewise will not accept less. Precisely with the aims of ensuring their security, the Warsaw Pact countries are required to constantly improve their defenses and the combat readiness of their armed forces and to maintain military-strategic parity so as not to allow any military superiority. All the defensive measures of the socialist states are designed solely for retaliatory actions and are aimed at defending their peoples against outside military attack.

In accord with the military-political concepts, the main essence of the military-technical aspect of military doctrine in the Warsaw Pact states is to maintain the armed forces on a level sufficient for defending the socialist countries, in retaliatory actions and in a decisive rebuff of imperialist aggression should imperialism endeavor to encroach on the sovereignty and security of the allied socialist countries.

Devoting great importance to this aspect of the doctrine, the Warsaw Pact states have proposed an entire range of practical measures for the NATO countries. These include: holding consultation for comparing military doctrines of both military alliances, an analysis of their nature and a joint examination of the directions of their further development; eliminating medium-range missiles, a significant cutback in armed forces, tactical nuclear weapons and conventional weapons in Europe; reducing the concentration of armed forces and weapons in the zone of direct contact of the sides to a specially agreed-upon level; the mutual withdrawal of the most dangerous types of offensive weapons from this zone; establishing a nuclear-free corridor along the line of contact of the Warsaw Pact and NATO up to 300 km wide and from which the withdrawal of all troops and other weapons on a reciprocal basis is proposed. In the strengthening of security, major significance is also given to the establishment of zones free of nuclear and chemical weapons.

Here the plan is to establish an effective system of control over all disarmament measures, combining national technical means and international procedures, including the establishing of the necessary international bodies for this purpose, the exchanging of military information and the carrying out of on-site inspections.

The document "On Military Doctrine" adopted at the conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact States points out that "the armed forces of the allied states are to be maintained in a combat readiness sufficient to prevent us from being caught by surprise and in the event that an attack is still made on them, they will deal a crushing rebuff to the aggressor." (9)

Military parity and its main element, military-strategic parity between the United States and USSR, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, both in terms of nuclear weapons as well as in terms of armed forces and conventional weapons is of crucial significance for restraining aggression and the carrying out of missions in a war by the armed forces.

The establishing of strategic parity has strengthened the positions of the USSR and of the socialist countries as a whole, and has dashed the hopes of the aggressive circles of imperialism for victory in a world nuclear war. The maintaining of parity is the most important factor for ensuring peace and international security.

However, the current, exceptionally high military balance must be reduced to such a level whereby none of the sides, in ensuring its defense, would have the forces for a reciprocal attack or for initiating and carrying out offensive operations.

The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries are not endeavoring to achieve military supremacy but they will also not permit the upsetting of the military-strategic balance existing on the world scene. If the preparations of the United States for Star Wars and military preparedness are continued, then the socialist countries will have no other choice but to take the appropriate measures of response.

"In being aware of the scale of the military threat," pointed out M.S. Gorbachev, "and recognizing our responsibility for the fate of peace, we will not permit the shattering of the military-strategic balance between the USSR and the United States, the Warsaw Pact and NATO. In the future, we will adhere to this policy for we have firmly and once and for all mastered what the past has taught us." (10)

V.I. Lenin said: "We have repeatedly stated our desire for peace and that we need peace.... But we do not intend to permit ourselves to be strangled to death in the name of peace." (11)

It is also essential to consider that under present-day conditions, the complexity and responsibility of carrying out the tasks entrusted to the Armed Forces have risen immeasurably. These are, in the first place, the completely new conditions for military service and the new demands on the combat readiness of all the Armed Services and combat arms. Under present-day conditions we must not permit the aggressive states to be better prepared for a war as was the case in the past.

Secondly, the Soviet Union, in conformity with the agreements [which it has] concluded, considers its international duty, along with the other allied countries, to be the assuring of a reliable defense and the security for the socialist countries. In this context there is a greater volume of international tasks for our Armed Forces in the system of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Countries.

Thirdly, the probable enemies confronting us are in no way comparable with the past. Under present-day conditions the Soviet Armed Forces together with the fraternal armies must be ready to carry out the task of defending socialism against strong, technically armed and perfidious enemies. This circumstance also requires a higher level of military art.

The defensive nature of our military doctrine places particularly high demands on the combat readiness of the armies and navies. The men of the socialist countries should show high vigilance and should always be ready

to thwart the intrigues of imperialism. This is particularly important if one considers that in the activities of the military personnel to maintain high combat readiness of the troops there are many serious shortcomings which were strictly and rightly pointed out by the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee in line with the violating of Soviet air space by a foreign aircraft at the end of May 1987. The Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee has repeatedly emphasized the fundamental importance of the task of decisively increasing the level of combat readiness and discipline in the Armed Forces, of able troop command, and of the ensuring of their constant ability to thwart any encroachments against the sovereignty of the Soviet state.

Leadership by the Communist Party over military organizational development and over the Armed Forces is the fundamental basis of the strengthening the defense of the Soviet Union. The complexity of the present-day international situation and the importance and responsibility of the military-political, ideological, economic and military-technical tasks being carried out further raise the role of the party in strengthening defense of the country.

Military Theory and Its Role in Strengthening the Defense of the Country

The decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the fraternal communist and worker parties have further developed Marxist-Leninist teachings concerning war and the army considering the interests of defending all the socialist commonwealth countries.

In recent years, a number of works and publications have examined the possible sources for the outbreak of wars and military conflicts, their political content and military-strategic nature, and have analyzed the main sociopolitical forces capable of preventing a nuclear war.

The results of this research and an analysis of the development prospects of military theory and practice, like historical experience, have with all persuasiveness confirmed the soundness of the patterns discovered by the founders of Marxism-Leninism and the fundamental methodological provisions worked out by them for a system of knowledge concerned with war and the army. At the same time, it has become obvious that in the modern age a number of problems of war and the army require a new approach.

In line with the major sociopolitical changes in the world, many crucial questions of war and the army have necessitated further thorough investigation and an examination of them in the general system of knowledge dealing with war and the army in encompassing all the processes and phenomena comprising a single whole. Special timeliness has been assumed by the methodological questions involving the processes of the self-cognition and self-analysis of sciences and theories investigating war and the army.

For precisely this reason under present-day conditions, in analyzing all knowledge dealing with war and the army, the role of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and all the component parts of Marxism-Leninism assume an ever-greater role as they provide a truly scientific, integrated approach to their investigation and cognition.

From the position of Marxism-Leninism and in light of the new thinking on the questions of war and the army as well as considering the new scientific achievements, it is advisable to examine in the general system the classification of the entire aggregate of scientific knowledge concerning war and the army, as well as to clarify the place and role of military science in this system of knowledge and its subject and structure. The author has taken up these questions in more detail, including the principle of the classification of military knowledge, in his work "M.V. Frunze—voennyy teoretik" [M.V. Frunze—Military Theorist].

It is essential first of all to emphasize that any system of knowledge can be reliable under the condition that it correctly reflects objective reality. For this reason a scientifically based classification is possible only with the most profound elucidation of the content of the object and subject of research and the sciences comprising this system. Precisely an incorrect approach to understanding the essence of this approach has given rise most often to differences of opinion and unsound judgments on the classification of the system of scientific knowledge dealing with war and the army.

For example, in certain encyclopedic publications and works, the concepts "war" and "armed conflict" are considered identical and the entire content of a war, in essence, is reduced solely to armed conflict.(12)

An identification of war and armed conflict leads to an ignoring of the class-political essence of war, since not every armed conflict is a war. A war is not limited merely to the clash and struggle of armed forces. It is a more multisided and complex sociopolitical phenomenon which influences all the life of society.

Historical experience shows that a war is a clash (conflict) of classes, nations, states, coalitions and social systems employing armed violence which is combined with other forms and means of conflict (economic, ideological, diplomatic and so forth).(13)

Over all history, armed conflict has been the main form of conflict in a war, representing the aggregate of military actions to achieve definite political aims. This was one of the most acute forms of social conflict and consisted in the organized employment of armed forces and other forces (the partisan movement, people's militia) for destroying the enemy and for the capture or defense of territory and property.

Certain judgments on the object and subject of the system of knowledge about war and the army. Proceeding from one or another understanding of the essence of war and armed conflict, in the military literature there has been the most diverse judgments concerning the specific content of the system of scientific knowledge dealing with war and the army.

In particular, the viewpoint has been expressed that this system includes the Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army, military science, military doctrine, military questions of scientific communism, military-economic knowledge and military history. There was also the opinion that the system of knowledge dealing with war and the army, in addition to the above-listed, also included the theory of party-political work, military pedagogy, military psychology and military legal science. The "Spravochnik ofitsera" [Officer's Handbook] states that the system of scientific knowledge about war and the army includes Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army, military science and military doctrine. (14)

An arbitrary, subjective approach has often been permitted in defining the structure and content of military knowledge. The authors of several articles and theoretical works, instead of analyzing the objective processes and patterns and on this basis determining the appropriate sectors of knowledge which they are understanding, have reduced this entire complex and precise work to a formal distribution of military problems in various sectors of knowledge, in adapting them to the existing structure of the established chairs and curricula.

In a number of works and articles, the system of military-scientific knowledge includes the following: the teachings about war and the army, the teachings about the defense of the socialist fatherland, military ethics, the military problems of scientific communism, international relations, law and so forth. Often this has been done without any explanation as to what principle was used to select and list these areas of knowledge. Why, for example, do the teachings about war and the army and the teachings about the defense of the socialist fatherland exist separately, or why has military economics which is related not only to political economy but also to concrete economic sciences and military science been put in the same row with the component parts of Marxist-Leninist theory with no mention being made of military science (a system of military-scientific knowledge without military science)? Sometimes an attempt is made to put military doctrine into a separate group of scientific knowledge, although military doctrine is based upon the entire aggregate of knowledge dealing with war and the army and is not a separate scientific area.

Frequently, the theoretical works and articles mention economic, ideological and other forms of conflict, but it remains unclear precisely what sciences study them.

In our military literature, other viewpoints have been voiced showing a differing approach to the structure of the system of knowledge dealing with war and the army. A positive aspect of these theoretical works was that they showed a valid desire for a comprehensive and interrelated examination of a number of important sectors of the system of knowledge dealing with war and the army. The completely correct conclusion was drawn that war, as a complex sociohistorical phenomenon, is studied not only by military science but also by many sciences in accord with their specific features. However, many of the theoretical works still did not cover the entire aggregate of knowledge about war and the army and permitted substantial errors of a methodological nature.

In accord with the Marxist-Leninist methodological classification of science and considering an analysis of the present-day objective nature of war and the army (with an integrated examination of war as a complex sociopolitical, social phenomenon representing not only a clash of armed forces but also the struggle of classes, states, coalitions and social systems), in our opinion, three groups of objective processes and phenomena stand out with perfect clarity and these require their own research, cognition and corresponding scientific reflection in the system of knowledge dealing with war and the army. These are, in the first place, the sociopolitical essence of war, its role and place among other social phenomena, and the problems of preventing it in the nuclear age; secondly, armed conflict and its support; thirdly, the economic, ideological and other nonmilitary means and forms of conflict with the enemy during the time of war.

In the first group are the most general laws of war, the aggregate of cardinal, underlying problems dealing with the conditions for the outbreak of a war and the rise of an army, their interconnections with other social phenomena, the problems of preventing war under present-day conditions, the philosophical-sociological, sociopolitical and socioeconomic essence of war as a whole, the problems stemming from this involving all forms of the conduct of war both by armed coercive suasion and by other nonmilitary means. These questions are studied by all three component parts of Marxism-Leninism and comprise its teachings about war and the army.

The second group of objective phenomena and patterns acting as the chief and decisive ones in a war has been linked in the history of wars with the specific features of continuing policy by means of armed violence in close relationship to the moral-political, economic and scientific-technical factors which provide for the conduct of armed conflict. These questions are the subject of research for military science as well as for the special areas (military problems) of a series of social, natural and technical sciences interrelated with military science and supporting the preparation and conduct of armed conflict.

The third group encompasses the phenomena and patterns stemming from the particular features of conducting warfare with an enemy by nonmilitary forms and

means. As historical experience has shown, politics during war has been carried out chiefly by means of armed suasion, but armed combat did not exhaust all the means and forms of politics. For this reason, for carrying out policy as a whole during a war, they also needed such forms of conflict as economic, scientific-technical, ideological, diplomatic and so forth with the subordination of their interests to the successful waging of the armed combat. The inner patterns of these forms of combat are examined by different social, natural and technical sciences in accord with their inherent problem areas.

From what we have examined it can be seen that the elucidation of the social essence of war and the army and the study of different forms of conflict involve an investigation of the most diverse patterns including sociopolitical, economic, military, technical, the elaboration of fundamentally different theoretical and applied problems. For this reason their understanding as a whole cannot be carried out by any one science. For investigating all these complex and diverse phenomena it is essential to have the combined efforts of a large number of sciences, including military. Just as there is and cannot be any one science which would study all aspects and phenomena of nature and society, so there is and cannot be one science dealing with the problems of war and the army.

All the listed areas of knowledge study war and consequently, the object of their cognition is the same. However, the subjects differ; these are determined by the patterns, by the categories and methods of research inherent to them. In defining the subject of research for any science, it is essential to always consider that for each science it is important first of all to know what comprises its specific features and what distinguishes it from other sciences. At present, there are hundreds of sciences and without such an approach it would be impossible to differentiate between them. It is a pattern of development that the wider and more complicated an object of research becomes, the larger the number of sciences studying it.

The most widespread error leading often to sterile disputes and unsound conclusions is that the subject of the science is identified with its object. However, the object of a science does not always coincide with its subject. For example, various problems of politics are studied by the theory of state and law, by philosophy, sociology, political economy, political geography and other sciences. Man is also studied by many sciences including physiology, anthropology, psychology, medicine and so forth. A whole series of sciences studies the earth and space.

The object of the study is the same in different sciences but their subjects are completely different. Thus, war is the object of research in military science. But such questions as the conditions of the rise, the essence and origin of war and so forth cannot be classified in the subject of military science. In studying only wars, it is impossible to answer the question of why they arose. The

founders of Marxism-Leninism disclosed the source of wars as a result of studying the economic system of society. They established that wars arose with the appearance of private property and with the division of society into classes. But this is the subject of historical materialism and political economy and not military science.

It is also perfectly apparent that not all scientific knowledge (economic, political, legal, mathematical and so forth) which is employed in military affairs applies to the practical activities of the armed forces and not all the scientific disciplines which are studied in military schools relate to military science. At times they have endeavored to define the subject of research of military science not in accord with the patterns examined by it and which is the only possible scientific approach, but rather proceeding from the erroneous notion that all knowledge which is necessary in military affairs can be incorporated in military science. This is as inaccurate as if all knowledge concerning nature was included in any one science.

As was already pointed out, war must not be reduced to just armed conflict. The economic, political and ideological forms of conflict are important means contributing to the successful waging of war. For the defense of the socialist fatherland it is essential to ready not only the armed forces but the entire country, the economy and all the people. Military science cannot stand on the sidelines of these tasks. It, and in particular the theory of military strategy, determines the demands placed on the country's military preparations. It considers the moral and economic capabilities of the state, but does this not by direct investigation of these questions but rather by proceeding from the conclusions of other socioeconomic sciences and the results of research on armed conflict.

The establishing of the economic and moral-political potential required for the country's defense is a function of party and state policy as a whole and requires consideration of a whole series of internal economic and moral-political patterns. Even during a war, when everything is subordinate to the goals of achieving victory, one must not direct ideological work or the country's economy proceeding merely from the ideas of military science. Political leadership carries out these complex and diverse tasks on a basis of Marxist-Leninist theory, using the achievements of many socioeconomic, technical and other sciences, including military.

Undoubtedly, armed conflict cannot be separated from the other phenomena of social life or from other forms of struggle and it must not be viewed in isolation from the moral-political and economic factors. Military science cannot investigate completely the methods of preparing and waging armed struggle without a profound knowledge of the laws of dialectics, but this, as has already been pointed out, does not directly examine the origin and essence of war, but in the examination of these

questions is based upon the concepts of the Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army as well as conclusions from other sciences.

According to the laws of the dialectics, everything in the world is interrelated, but if only this aspect of things is considered and the differentiation of scientific knowledge is not taken into account, if all sciences should study only the object common to them and did not have a subject of cognition specific to each of them, then modern science would be on a level of ancient philosophy which encompassed the entire aggregate of knowledge dealing with nature and society. On this grounds it would be wrong to raise the question that Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army, military science and the other areas of military scientific knowledge should continue to study war as a whole without having their own subject of cognition, as here any sense is lost in classifying the system of military knowledge and it is impossible to achieve a thorough understanding of all its aspects and diverse phenomena.

Marxist-Leninist methodology requires a clear definition of the subject and the boundaries of investigation for all the main areas of the system of knowledge dealing with war and the army. In accord with this and considering the present-day objective conditions, let us examine in general outlines the content of the sciences and theories comprising this complex system of knowledge.

Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army

As was already pointed out, Marxism-Leninism investigates the most general laws of war, its cardinal problems, encompassing all phenomena in the most complete form. Prior to the rise of Marxism there was not a truly scientific theory about war and the army. At the same time, it must be pointed out that a hazy notion that war is wider than armed conflict and that it cannot be investigated merely within the confines of military science arose at the beginning of the 19th Century.

Even then to one degree or another they began to understand that war is not confined to armed conflict and does not remain within the confines of military science and military art.

In certain capitalist countries, it was felt that the highest teachings about war was polemology (from the Greek "polemos" or war) a science dealing with war as a phenomenon of a social order, with its causes and consequences in all aspects—economic, political, demographic, moral and so forth.

In our country, after the Great October Socialist Revolution and the Civil War, certain military specialists, for example A.Ye. Snegarev, proposed "assigning" to military strategy the study of the sociopolitical and socio-economic phenomena of war, and in line with this broaden the limits of strategy, not considering here that these

questions could not be the subject of direct investigation for the theory of strategy. Such an approach would have violated the scientific principles for the classification of sciences.

M.N. Tukhachevskiy proceeded from the view that the Supreme Command which directed the war as a whole could not be guided solely by military strategy, by the "pure strategy" of the old type, and for this reason the need arose for a certain new, higher strategy. The term "polemostrategy" was proposed by him for this higher teaching about war. This teaching about war on this level was viewed by M.N. Tukhachevskiy and certain of his followers as a science dealing with the essence of war, with the preparation and most effective use of the country's forces for victory.

M.V. Frunze also recognized that the teachings about war as a whole did not remain within the limits of strategy and that military science cannot directly know the political aspect of a war. But he did not consider it necessary to introduce any new sector dealing with the sociopolitical essence of war. He firmly adhered to the viewpoint that in the general system of scientific knowledge about war and the army, an understanding of this aspect of war is provided by the Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army. He assigned to political strategy the decisive role in leadership of the war.

More than a century's experience has confirmed that only Marxist-Leninist theory can provide a truly authentic scientific explanation of phenomena. The problems of war and the army are investigated by all component parts of Marxism-Leninism which, as an integrated, unified theory, studies them with the aid of laws, categories and principles of philosophy, scientific communism and political economy. Proceeding from this in the structure of Marxist-Leninist theory it is possible to establish philosophical-sociological, sociopolitical and political-economic bases (aspects) in the teachings about war and the army and these in their aggregate comprise an interrelated, unified Marxist-Leninist teaching about war and the army.

In examining the essence and general laws of war and the army the leading role is played by Marxist-Leninist philosophy and primarily historical materialism which is the methodological and ideological [mirovotzrencheskoy] basis of the entire system of knowledge dealing with war and the army. In particular, historical materialism examines the philosophical and sociological bases of the teachings about war and the army; the essence of war and the army, the general sociological patterns of their origin and development; ways of preventing war in the modern age; the relationship of war and politics, war and ideology; the social nature and types of war, the role of war and the army in history; the relationship of the objective and subjective in war and military affairs; the role of the

masses of people and the individual in war; philosophical bases in shaping the moral-combat qualities of the soldiers; the philosophical and sociological aspects of militarism and so forth.

Many new problems arise in examining these questions under present-day conditions. In the 1970s, when there was a tendency for a lessening of international tension, certain bourgeois ideologists wrote about a change in the aggressive essence of imperialism and about its peacefulness. Now, when the situation in the world has become exacerbated, they, on the contrary, shout about the inevitability and necessity of wars. For this reason particularly great significance is assumed by questions involving the investigation of the aggressive essence of imperialism under present-day conditions, the specific sources and factors for the outbreak of wars in our times and the questions of the struggle to prevent a world nuclear war.

The sociopolitical aspects of the teachings about war and the army are investigated by scientific communism and primarily by the teachings on the defense of the socialist fatherland. Scientific communism investigates the problems of war and peace in the modern age, the sources of the defense of the socialist fatherland and the sociopolitical principles of military organizational development in the socialist state; it discloses the objective necessity of the leading role of the Marxist-Leninist party on the question of the defense of socialism and military organizational development, the military aspects of the political strategy of the communist, workers and national liberation movements. One of the most urgent tasks in this area remains also a profound study of the patterns of strengthening the military-political union of the socialist states, the military-political aspects of the joint defense of socialism, the collaboration of the socialist state armies and the sociopolitical bases for the military might of the socialist countries.

The political and economic aspects of the teachings about war and the army are related to an understanding of the economic patterns of law and the army; the influence of the economic factor on the course and outcome of the war; the material bases of the military might of a state; the specific actions of economic laws during the period of preparing and waging wars in various socioeconomic formations, the political and economic problems of reducing weapons and primarily the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

Under present-day conditions, when the aggressive circles of imperialism have exacerbated the international situation to a maximum and have begun a new round of the arms race, while the interests of all mankind require a reduction in weapons and disarmament, great timeliness is assumed by research on the particular manifestation of the economic laws of capitalism in military production and to what limits an arms race is possible in

economic terms. Also of important significance is an investigation of the effect of militarism on various aspects of productive relations in a capitalist society.

The political economy of socialism studies the influence of public ownership on the military-economic processes, the particular features of the social aspects of military production in a socialist society; the role of the planned development of the economy for mobilizing material resources in the interests of defense; the nature of socialist expanded reproduction in the course of preparing and waging a war; the role of the economy in strengthening the defense capability of the Soviet state and other political and economic problems to ensure sufficient defense of the country.

Thus, the Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army are not only a component part of historical materialism, as this was depicted, at one time in our literature and scholarly practices.⁽¹⁵⁾ These teachings are a synthesis of the interrelated study of war and the army by all component parts of Marxism-Leninism. The necessity and validity of such an integrated investigation of the Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army is completely apparent and can be explained by the following considerations.

In the first place, not only the teachings about war and the army but also many other fundamental teachings and concepts of Marxism-Leninism are investigated by component parts of Marxism-Leninism from different viewpoints, from them stems the unified teaching about the state, classes and the class struggle, the proletarian revolution and so forth. For example, historical materialism investigates the essence of the state, its role and place in the political organization of society; political economy does the same for the economic system of society and its influence on the structure and nature of the state superstructure; the theory of scientific communism examines the essence of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the development of the state during the period of socialism. V.I. Lenin in his book "State and Revolution" created a subchapter "The Teachings of Marxism About the State and the Tasks of the Proletariat in a Revolution."

Secondly, objectively all phenomena related to war and the army are in a close unity between themselves and only hypothetically is it possible to split them into component parts. For example, the elaboration of the theory of the defense of the socialist fatherland is impossible without an understanding of the philosophical, sociological and economic bases of war and the army. War is a two-sided phenomenon and the problem of the defense of the socialist fatherland cannot be investigated abstractly, in isolation from such questions as the aggressive essence of imperialism, the possible sources, types and kinds of wars, and the general laws and factors determining the possible conditions for the unleashing of a war by the imperialists and the defense of the socialist fatherland under present-day conditions.

Thirdly, if the Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army are viewed as isolated, separate phenomena and even such a question as the military organization of socialism is considered a separate teaching not part of the theory of the defense of the socialist fatherland and the latter is not part of the Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army, with such an approach it is impossible to have a systematic investigation of them and hence examine this in all its complexity and completeness. And this leaves aside the fact that such eclectic theoretical constructs are devoid of elementary logic. One might ask what is the theoretical and practical sense of the Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army if these do not answer the main question of how to defend the socialist fatherland or what defense of the socialist fatherland can there be without a definite military organization, or how can one view war and the army in isolation from one another, if armed violence, let alone a war, does not happen without an army?

At times, concern has been voiced and is voiced over the question of broadening the subject and the functions of the teachings about war and the army and "pulling apart" these teachings, and appeals have been made to preserve the specific subject of the philosophical and sociological system of knowledge dealing with war and the army. But these fears are imaginary, for no one has ever proposed or does propose to "pull apart" the Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army and has not encroached on its specific features. It is simply impossible to call just the philosophical-sociological part of the teachings the "Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army," as this concept inevitably encompasses the problems of all the component parts of Marxism-Leninism.

When V.I. Lenin was examining the teachings about the state which have their theoretical sources in all three component parts of Marxism, he did not comment on their specific subject, he did not "restrict" or "widen" their content but rather viewed them in a unity and in a relationship, encompassing all aspects and sides of the phenomenon being examined and on this basis created an integrated and ordered teaching about the state. There should be the same approach to the study of war and the army.

All the provisions of the Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army objectively and logically exist in a close relationship and only in this systematized form can they be employed both in the educational process and in practical activities.

The Role and Place of Military Science in the System of Knowledge About War and the Army

Military science holds an important place in the general system of knowledge about war and the army. Since this science has always been above all linked to an understanding of armed conflict as the decisive tool of politics

during war, it has held the main role in working out the methods of achieving political goals by armed means. The subject of this science is also determined by this.

In his own time M.V. Frunze sharply criticized the Trotskyites who asserted that military affairs are based on all sciences, beginning with geography and ending with psychology, and for this reason there is no need for any separate military science. Mikhail Vasilyevich [Frunze] with profound conviction proved that precisely the presence of a specific subject provides an objective basis for the existence of military science, although in military affairs the achievements of other sciences must also be used.

What specific objective processes must be investigated by military science and which, in addition to it, are not understood by any other areas of knowledge and cannot be understood? These are primarily: the nature of armed conflict, the methods of its preparation and conduct on the strategic, operational and tactical scales; the composition, organization and technical equipping of the armed forces needed to conduct armed combat; the processes of command and control (leadership of the troops (forces)) in peacetime and wartime, their military training and education; the influence of armed conflict on the economy and the economic support for the organizational development, training and combat employment of the armed forces; previous military experience.

Proceeding from the necessity of understanding these objective phenomena and their patterns, the subject, content and structure of military science are determined.

The results of many years of research and the conclusions of debates on this question have been most correctly depicted in the "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia] and the "Voyennyy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar" [Military Encyclopedic Dictionary] where **military science is viewed as a system of knowledge concerned with the laws and military-strategic nature of war, the organizational development and preparation of the armed forces and the nation for war and the methods of waging it.** In terms of Soviet and generally socialist military science, it is a question of preparing the country and the armed forces for the defence of the socialist fatherland and the methods of conducting armed combat [vooruzhennoy borby] to repel aggression. Armed combat in war is the main subject of examination for military science.

At first glance it may seem contradictory that on the one hand, armed combat is the subject of military science and, on the other, its subject includes the laws of war, the methods of waging it, and the questions of preparing for war not only for the armed forces but for the country as a whole. This definition emphasizes: **armed combat is the basic subject of military science**, for military science, in being guided by Marxist-Leninist methodology and the teachings about war and the army and in relying on the

achievements of other sciences, examines armed combat in an inseparable relation to the general laws of war, to the socioeconomic and sociopolitical factors as well as the influence of armed combat on these factors. With the present nature of armed combat, it is impossible to examine it in isolation from these factors. But military science examines only those aspects of phenomena which comprise its specific features. In particular, when it is a question of the preparation of the country to repel aggression, then one has in mind the military aspect of this matter. At the same time, it must be considered that armed combat is examined not only by military science but also other sciences within the limits of their subject.

From the very outset of its rise, war as a continuation of politics by coercive means [sredstvami nasiliye] was a social phenomenon; armed forces are a part of the sociopolitical superstructure and a social organism. For this reason, military science, in examining the phenomena of war within the limits of its subject, studies primarily the social forms of the movement of matter and is a social science. At the same time it is involved not only with the social processes and phenomena but also the natural and technical ones.

In defining the structure of military science, the role and place of its various areas, we employ the general principles of classification. But the particular nature of war and military affairs also requires consideration of particular features. The areas of military science cannot always be broken down according to the principle of from the simple to the complex, from the lower to the higher. As is known, military strategy is subordinate to politics and derives from it, operational art proceeds from the demands of strategy and so forth. Here all the questions of the organizational development, training and support of the armed forces are resolved proceeding from the strategic nature and the methods of armed combat. These require a reply to the questions: what armed forces are needed, for what war and how to prepare them and so forth. At the same time feedback from below must also be considered. Strategic or operational success arises from the aggregate of successful combat actions of the subunits, units and formations. It is essential to take into account the multiplicity of complex relationships along the horizontal and the diagonal, particularly the influence of the development of weapons and equipment on the methods of conducting combat operations and a whole series of other connections and interdependencies.

The structure and content of military science should reflect most fully the above listed objective processes studied by it. Proceeding from the given definition of the subject of military science, its structure and content can be represented in approximately the following form.

According to a subject classification of the areas of military science carried out in accord with the patterns being examined, military science includes: the general bases or the general theory of military science, the theory

of military art, the theory of the organizational development of the armed forces, the theory of military instruction and upbringing, the theory of military economy and rear services of the armed forces, the history of the armed forces and military art (the problems of military history encompassed by its subject).

Military science, like any other science, has primarily its own bases or general theory. V.I. Lenin in his work "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism" posed the question of deducing a general theory of political economy and advanced the idea of the need to develop it from the positions of Marxism.(16)

The general theory of military science under present-day conditions examines the system of laws of armed combat in interrelation to the general laws of war, the subject and structure of military science, its role and place in the general system of knowledge dealing with war and the army. At present, when the science of science [naukovedeniye] has appeared, it is very important that this science dealing with sciences has its own reference points in all sectors of knowledge in the form of their general bases or theories. A more profound self-understanding of each science would contribute to the elucidation of common processes occurring in all sciences.

The theory of military art is the core of military science. This examines the laws, nature, principles and methods of conducting armed combat on the strategic, operational and tactical scales and correspondingly includes the theory of strategy, operational art and tactics.

The theory of strategy, in being the superior area of the theory of military art and being common to all armed forces, examines the military-strategic nature of a war, the laws, principles and methods of armed combat on the strategic scale, it works out recommendations on preparing the country in military terms, the forms and methods of strategic operations, and the problems of the command and control of armed forces, and it studies the question of considering and using the moral-political and economic capabilities of a state in the interests of conducting armed combat and organizing strategic support.

The theory of operational art examines the nature, patterns, principles and methods of preparing and conducting combined-arms (combined-fleet) joint and independent operations [operatsiy] (combat actions [deystviy]) by large units of the armed forces, the activities of the operational levels in the command and control of troops (forces), the questions of the consideration and use of the moral-political and economic factors in preparing and conducting operations, the organization and methods of operational, rear and special technical support for the operations. Correspondingly, it includes the theory of combined-arms operational art and this studies the principles of operational art common to all the armed services as well as the theory of the employment of the

Ground Troops; the theory of the operational art of the Strategic Rocket Forces, the Air Forces, Air Defense Forces, Navy, the operational rear services and civil defense.

The theory of tactics is concerned with questions of preparing and conducting combat by subunits, units and formations in various spheres—on land, at sea and in the air. In accord with this, it includes the theory of the tactics of combined-arms battle and the theory of tactics of the armed services, the combat arms (forces) and special troops.

If one speaks about the theory of military art as a whole, as the methods of conducting armed combat become more complex, we will experience an ever-greater need for wide generalizations which disclose the profound sense of the fundamental, qualitative changes in military affairs and the general patterns of its development.

Under present-day conditions, one of the primary problems (tasks) for the theory of military art is to continue further profound research to disclose the military-strategic nature of armed conflict, the main traits and particular features of strategic operations, operations of large units of the combat arms, combined-arms, naval and air battle.

However, it must be considered that it is very difficult to solve this problem. The fact is that the employment of modern types of weapons which were not used before entails much that is still unknown. It is impossible to test this out completely under peacetime conditions and this to a significant degree impedes a solution to the task of disclosing the characteristic traits and a scientific forecast of the possible development of a future war.

At the same time, it can be said with a definite degree of reliability that if the imperialists succeed in launching a war, it will be a global clash of multimillion-strong coalition armed forces, unprecedented in scope and fierceness. In the course of it all the military, economic and spiritual might of the combatant states, coalitions and social systems will be fully utilized.

Soviet military strategy, proceeding from the principles of our state's policy, excludes being the first to employ nuclear weapons and is generally against the use of weapons of mass destruction. But any possible aggressor should be perfectly aware that in the event of a nuclear missile attack on the USSR or the other socialist commonwealth countries, it will receive an annihilating retaliatory strike.

In accord with the defensive nature of military doctrine, the theory of military art proceeds from the view that at the outset of a war, in repelling enemy aggression, defensive operations and battles will be the basic means of combat operations for our army. However, it is impossible to achieve a complete defeat of the enemy by defense alone. For this reason in the course of the war

(after repelling enemy aggression) the basic means of combat actions, in going over to a counteroffensive, will be decisive counteroffensive actions combined with defense, depending on the situation.

All the main types of modern operations have assumed a combined-arms character and are carried out by the joint, coordinated efforts of the various armed services and combat arms. On the one hand, the range of fire (actions) has increased, the capabilities for coordination between formations and large strategic units have broadened and not only in operational-tactical terms but also in terms of fire; on the other hand, the complexity of organizing cooperation has risen as well as the scope of the tasks which must here be carried out by the commanders and staffs.

The conduct of operations and military actions is envisaged as proceeding from the following main principles: constant high readiness to carry out combat tasks; maximum activeness and decisiveness of actions; coordinated employment of all the armed services, combat arms and forces in their close cooperation; the decisive concentration of efforts on the most important axes (areas) at the crucial moment for carrying out the main missions; uninterrupted military actions [deystviy] and their conduct with maximum intensity; flexible maneuver, the early establishment and skillful use of reserves; surprise of actions and the excluding of surprise by the enemy; ensuring high morale of one's troops; complete support of combat actions; firm and continuous command and control of troops.

The conduct of combat actions at high tempos and to a great depth, frequently under the conditions of the absence of a continuous front, requires from commanders at all levels the demonstration of high initiative, independence, and the ability to confidently direct [upravlyat] troops under complex situational conditions and given active enemy electronic countermeasures.

The increasing role of strategy and operational art does not decrease the role of tactics, particularly under conditions when combat actions will be carried out without the employment of nuclear weapons. The timeliness of examining the fundamental problems of tactics is explained also by the fact that it is most susceptible to all changes in the means of the conduct of battle.

It is an issue of finding not only the best method of employing one or another type of weapon but also determining the particular features of its integrated employment in the necessary quantities combined with other combat weapons, and to find that limit where the dialectical pattern of a transition from quantity into quality begins to operate.

The most characteristic trait of tactics is the growing importance of a firefight [ognevogo boy]. At present it is possible with existing weapons to cause significant damage to the enemy even long before establishing direct

contact. Here as the range of missile and artillery fire grows, the range of the firefight also continuously increases. It is necessary to emphasize that the growing importance of elaborating the problem of the tactics of a firefight relates not only to the Ground Troops but also to the Air Forces, Navy and other branches of the armed services.

The theory of the organizational development of the armed forces examines the following problems: the maintenance of troops and naval forces at a high level of combat readiness to fulfill combat missions and to mobilize; the most effective organizational structure of the armed forces; the principles and methods of their manning, supplying with technical equipment, and the training of reserves; the system of training military cadres and their standing of military service; the organization of troop services and the strengthening of military discipline; the billeting of troops ([naval] forces) in peacetime and wartime and other questions.

As a whole the theory under examination is called upon to elaborate scientifically grounded recommendations for practical activities concerning the organizational development of the armed forces. While V.I. Lenin 60 years ago said that "...without science it is impossible to build a modern army,"(17) this is all the more impossible without a sound scientific base and without a profound theoretical basis for carrying out the organizational development and training of the armed forces under the new conditions, in the age of stormy scientific-technical progress. The Soviet Union is not aiming for military-technical superiority, but the ever-wider involvement of scientific achievements by the imperialists in the sphere of military preparations, and the sharp rivalry in the qualitative improvement of weapons and military equipment presuppose a shifting of the center of gravity on the question of the organizational development and training of armed forces in the area of a clash of scientific and technical ideas.

In the theory of the organizational development of the Armed Forces, the investigation of the ways for the coordinated development of the various means of armed combat is of great timeliness, since it is essential to solve the problem of effective ratios between the branches of troops and services, the combat and support units and subunits as well as the personnel, the equipment and weapons in the branches of the armed services on a truly scientific basis.

The qualitative improvement in the means of attack in the imperialist states and the growing role of the time factor impose new demands upon the combat readiness of the Army and Navy. For this reason a general and main problem of both the theory of military art as well as the theory of the organizational development of the armed forces is the seeking out of ways to further increase the combat readiness of the troops (forces) and their ability to conduct decisive actions to defeat any aggressor.

The theory of military training and upbringing works out the forms and methods of operational and combat training, the shaping of high political and combat morale qualities in the men, their military upbringing in the process of the entirety of military service, and the coordination of subunits, units (ships) and formations to ensure their high combat capability and readiness.

One of the problems of military affairs has always been, on the one hand, how to correctly foresee the nature and methods of combat operations [boyevykh deystviy] and in accord with this to determine the content of instruction, that is, what to teach the troops, and on the other, to work out troop education and training methods which would ensure the carrying out of these views concerning the conduct of war. For this reason the elaboration and introduction of an advanced combat training method which corresponds to the present development level of military affairs is one of the most important ways for realizing the unity of military theory and practice and realizing the principle of teaching the troops what is required in war.

In investigating the questions of military training and education, along with the general pedagogical principles and methods, consideration must also be given to such demands as the necessity of inculcating in the personnel special combat morale [moralno-boyevykh] qualities and not just training the individual servicemen but also developing combat teamwork in the formations and units for the joint conduct of combat operations [boyevykh deystviy], the maintaining of constant combat readiness of the troops and naval forces in the training process and a number of others. This also determines the role and place in the system of military science of the theory of troop training and education and this examines the specific questions of training the Armed Forces considering the principles of military pedagogy and psychology.

The CPSU Program has pointed out that "the party in the future will be constantly concerned so that the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces represents a strong fusion of military skill and a high level of supply of technical equipment, ideological steadfastness, organization and discipline of the personnel, their loyalty to patriotic and international duty."(18) The theory of military training and education must in every possible way enable the resolution of this important task.

The theory of military economy and the Rear Services of the armed forces. In our military press and at the conference of the military scientific bodies in Warsaw in 1977, there were individual statements that the entire problem of military economy should be studied by a so-called military economic science or the theory of the military economy. Doubt was expressed as to the validity of incorporating a theory of military economy and rear services into military science. These opinions were not supported as a consequence of their insufficient scientific argumentation. The problem is that military

economy is in essence the entire national economy shifted to a wartime footing. While the economy in peacetime is studied by hundreds of sciences, this economy converted to war cannot be studied by any one science, in particular military-economic.

In actuality the questions of military economy and the economic support of a war are studied by many sciences which form a system of military economic knowledge. On the methodological level this can be divided into three interrelated groups.

The first group is the military problem of political economy, examining the economic bases of the power of the state and its armed forces, the importance of the economic factor and its influence on the course and outcome of war and other fundamental provisions comprising the methodological basis of the entire system of military-economic knowledge.

The second group is the military problems (military aspects) of the interbranch and branch specific economic sciences, that is, the science of planning the economy, labor economics, economic statistics, financial sciences, the many economic sectors of industry, agriculture, transport, communications and so forth. Take for example, financial science, the study of the laws of the functioning of finances in peacetime. Its functions cannot be transferred in wartime to any other science, for instance, military-economic. Only it, relying on the basis of financial science, can and should study the particular features of the functioning of finances in wartime. This applies also to the other economic problems and sciences.

The third group includes the theory of military economy and the rear services of the armed forces as a component part of military science. This studies only what is related to the subject of military science in this area, that is: the military-strategic nature of the war and the ensuing demands on the economy, the military aspects of ensuring its viability; the general (military) bases for mobilizing and shifting the economy from a peacetime to a wartime status; economic support for the operations of the Armed Forces (the element of the linkage of the country's rear with the rear of the Armed Forces). In terms of the Armed Forces' Rear this should study: the general patterns and principles in the organization and functioning of the Armed Forces' Rear Services; the system of rear support for the armed forces in peacetime and wartime; the organization and activities of the strategic rear, its relationship to the military economy; the role and place of the operational and organic rear services in the general system of the Armed Forces' Rear Services; rear support for all types of operations; economic work among the troops in peacetime. It can be said that the importance of the subject-problem classification can be seen most clearly in this area of military science.

The theory of military economy and the Armed Forces' Rear Services cannot be a military aspect of other economic sciences, as has sometimes been proposed, for the above-listed questions are related to the nature of armed combat and for this reason only military science can investigate them.

In examining this and certain other similar questions, sometimes a confusion is made between the science, the branch of science and a studied scientific discipline [uchebnuyu nauchnuyu distsiplinu]. For example, in the VUZes it is perfectly valid to have the existence of a studied scientific discipline "military economy" where in a generalized form they set out the basic information from the appropriate areas of political economy, military science and the applied economic sciences. The principle of the approach here is the same as in working out textbooks for "Social Sciences" or "Natural Sciences," where one includes a certain sum of knowledge from the various social and natural sciences. But this is done for a teaching purpose and not as a classification of sciences, where the above-examined methodological criteria and principles are requisite.

Given the subject-problem classification of branch military science, this includes and examines such sectors as the theory of the command and control of armed forces, the theory of weaponry of the combat arms and of civil defense. The process of the differentiation of military-technical knowledge and at the same time the need for their integrated examination in close relation to operational-strategic questions have brought about a tendency for the separation and individual examination of the theory of weaponry as part of military science.

The isolation within military science of these areas of knowledge is a reflection of one of the patterns in the development of scientific knowledge generally, when a problem-by-problem classification leads to the formation of a number of interdisciplinary sciences. This is one of the forms of the integration of sciences under the conditions of their ongoing differentiation and narrow specialization.

In accord with the principles of a problem-by-problem classification, all the above-listed areas of military knowledge can be put in interdisciplinary sectors of military science where the efforts and methods of different theories and boundary sciences cooperate, as, for instance, the corresponding areas of physics, chemistry, geology, geography, biology and so forth are concentrated in oceanology.

The necessity of isolating certain areas of military science with a problem-by-problem classification arose in line with a systems examination of all kindred, interrelated problems arising simultaneously in different areas of military science as well as in line with the establishing of good conditions for the fullest use of achievements in the area of other social, natural and technical sciences in the interests of solving these problems.

Thus, the theory of command and control [upravleniye] of armed forces is examined primarily in the system of strategic, operational and tactical leadership of the troops (forces) in preparing and conducting operations [operatsiy] and combat actions [deystviy]. However, the processes of command and control occur not only in the conduct of military operations but also in the organizational development of the armed forces, in the training and education of the personnel and so forth. Here it is not a question of removing questions of command and control from these areas of activity of the military cadres. This is impossible. There are patterns and principles which are equally important for the processes of command and control in any areas of military activity and these a theory of command and control should examine comprehensively, from uniform positions using the achievements of cybernetics and the theses of the science of command and control.

Incidentally, questions of management [upravleniye] are examined and elaborated in the areas of industry, agriculture, transport and in many other spheres, but at the same time there is a universally recognized science of management which investigates the general patterns and principles, the bases of management activity as a whole. This applies also to the theory of the command and control of armed forces, which cannot be limited solely to the sphere of military operations. Leadership over the complicated and diverse life of the troops (forces) in peacetime, including the maintenance of high combat and mobilizational readiness, the organization of operational, combat and political training, the maintenance of weapons and equipment, the organization of troop services and the maintenance of military discipline — is an enormous area of activity which cannot help but have its own scientific bases. This requires a sound theoretical elaboration and practical assimilation by the military cadres. Only under this condition is it possible to increase the scientific level of troop leadership.

The theory of weaponry must elaborate scientifically sound conclusions and recommendations for carrying out a unified military-technical policy in the armed forces proceeding from the nature of armed conflict and the requirements of military art. Its most important problems are: disclosing the development patterns of weapons and military equipment, given the change in the nature of armed combat; the elaboration of long-range strategic and operational-tactical requirements for weapons systems; the theoretical bases for the development of future and current weapons programs, the employment of methods of systemic analysis to determine the optimal ratio of various types of weapons and military equipment and the directions for the coordinated development of weaponry.

Since war is a two-sided phenomenon, in defining the content of the various areas of military science, it is essential to bear in mind that in their subject of investigation they include the organization, weaponry and methods of operations of not only our own troops but also the troops of probable or actual enemies.

The task of military science is, on the one hand, to ensure the development of truly promising types of weapons and equipment which meet the nature of a future war, on the other hand, to work out methods of combat which provide the fullest utilization of the combat capabilities of the new types of weapons and equipment.

The thesis advanced by F. Engels that precisely the material conditions and the development of weapons and equipment presuppose changes in the methods of waging war has kept its importance under present-day conditions. At the same time, one must emphasize the growing reverse influence of military science on weapons development. On the basis of a correct prediction of the nature of a possible future war, military science should work out sound demands and determine the specific directions of their development.

On the theory of the branches of the armed services and the unity of military science. All areas of knowledge comprising military science, in turn, have a complex structure. These are interrelated by close coordination and subordination. The processes of the differentiation and integration of sciences also make necessary a systemic review of the various problems related to the use of the branches of the armed forces in a war. Their complicated practical activities are carried out both in peacetime and in wartime and this objective reality should be reflected in science.

In each branch of the armed forces, in addition, it is possible to establish certain special problem areas of knowledge. This is a completely natural process in the development of any science. Certainly there is a unified Marxist-Leninist theory and at the same time such interrelated component parts as philosophy, political economy and the theory of scientific communism have become relatively independent theories.

Even F. Engels, in examining the laws of the evolution of science, pointed out that "in a similar manner, one form of motion develops from another so that the reflections of these forms, the various sciences, should, by necessity, stem one from another." (19)

In the course of the development of military science, new theories and scientific directions have arisen and have been set apart as relatively independent areas. But still military science, under present-day conditions, is viewed as a complex but still unified system of interrelated and continuously developing areas of knowledge.

In the first place, as has already been established, according to Marxist-Leninist methodology, sciences differ primarily according to what patterns they investigate. In accord with this, military science is based upon an understanding of the objective patterns common to armed combat and the experience of conducting military operations has not disclosed special laws of armed combat inherent only to one or another branch of the armed forces.

Secondly, the growing importance of the unity of modern military science is determined by the altered conditions of conducting armed combat. For example, in the past, when there were two relatively independent branches of the armed forces (ground forces and navy) in a number of countries and which frequently proceeded from different strategic concepts and carried out their missions independently of one another, it was still possible to justify the separate existence of military and naval sciences.

But in modern armed combat, the importance of joint strategic actions [deystviy] of the various branches of our armed forces has risen sharply as has the role of strategy, which is common to all of them. In practical terms, the various forms of strategic actions [deystviy] and strategic operations [operatsii], including those on oceanic TVDs can now be carried out only by the joint efforts of the various branches of the armed forces. Since each branch of the armed forces cannot have its own individual strategy, without such an important part of military science which comprises its main core, the existence of individual sciences for branches of the armed forces is impossible. Generally, under present-day conditions an examination of all the questions related to the organizational development and training of the armed forces from uniform positions and from the viewpoint of their common interests is assuming decisive significance.

Moreover, the interests of the question require the elaboration of an ordered and scientifically sound structure for military science with a uniform approach to all branches of the armed forces.

Certainly each branch of the armed forces has its own essential operational-tactical and military-technical features. In this context it is completely valid to view within the unified military science the theories of the branches of the armed forces, which include theories of the military art of the branches (the methods of the strategic employment of the branches, the theory of operational art, the theory of tactics of the combat arms, services and forces), the particular features of their organizational development, military training and education and the history of the branches of the armed forces as inseparable parts of this single science. Consequently, it is a question not of negating the long-existing knowledge relating to the branches, but merely of a correct and scientifically sound formulation of these. The word "theory" to no degree depreciates this military knowledge but merely emphasizes its belonging to a unified military science.

This also applies to the types of troops, to the special troops and services and to all the types of operational (combat) and special technical support. The methods of the employment of these troops and types of support for operations [operatsii] also can and should be viewed altogether, in terms of armed combat as a whole, as well as for the individual operations, types of combat and the combat employment of the combat arms. All these

scientific problems comprise both the corresponding sectors of military science as well as the theories of the branches of the armed forces.

Military science jointly with other sciences studies the problems of civil defense. These include: the principles of protecting the population and national economy as a whole in a modern war; the ways of increasing the stability of the economy; the methods of organizing work to eliminate the consequences of an enemy attack; the methods of action of the civil defense units and the paramilitary formations, the organization and methods of the command and control of the country's civil defense forces.

Since military science is chiefly a social science, it cannot have a strict national affiliation. If one speaks about its essence and examines it from party, class positions, it is essential to point out that in practical terms there is a socialist military science and a bourgeois military science, just as there is no English or Russian political economy but there is a political economy of socialism and a political economy of capitalism. Here, of course, one must not deny certain national features of socialist and bourgeois military science.

Marxist-Leninist military science and the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact member-states, like the construction of socialism as a whole, are a unity of the international and the national.

Their international character derives from the commonality of the socialist social and state system; from the unified Marxist-Leninist ideology and agreed upon policy; from the general laws of war, the principles of military art and the organizational development of the socialist commonwealth armies for the defense of the achievements of socialism. At the same time, national features related to the specific traits of each country and its armed forces are taken into account in the organizational development and training of the armed forces and in working out questions of military art in the fraternal armies. In this sense with full justification and pride we can speak of Soviet military science which reflects the achievements of our military scientific thought and the experience of the strongest and battle-tempered Armed Forces of the Soviet state, just as we speak about the achievements of Soviet science as a whole.

Socialist military science has been developed by the joint efforts of the fraternal socialist countries and this has made it possible to successfully carry out the tasks of further increasing their defense capability and the defense of socialism. Its provisions are also used by the peoples carrying out the national liberation struggle for their freedom and independence.

The military aspect of social, natural and technical sciences. The change in the nature of World Wars I and II, the subsequent strengthening and broadening of the ties of military science with social, natural and technical

sciences have led to the appearance of the military aspect in a whole series of social, natural and technical sciences and linked to the organizational development and training of the Army and Navy, to the development of weapons and military equipment and to all-round support for the preparation and conduct of armed combat.

In actuality, for organizing the country's defense it is essential to consider profoundly many sociopolitical questions and the influence of natural conditions on its waging, ensure the elaboration and development of weapons and combat equipment which conform to the nature of combat, investigate and work out other questions relating to the all-round support, preparation and conduct of operations and combat actions. All of this requires the involvement and use of many sciences in the interests of the state's defense.

The Soviet Union is against involving science in the sphere of military preparations, it does not seek military-technical superiority, but the ever-greater employment of scientific-technical progress for military aims on the part of the imperialist countries has also forced the socialist countries to give proper attention to the level of supply of technical equipment to the armed forces.

The experience of preparing the Army and Navy personnel for war, of developing military equipment, its operation under combat conditions shows that in the interests of armed combat it is completely insufficient to use the achievements of social, technical and natural sciences in a "ready-made form." The tasks carried out in a combat situation differ fundamentally from the tasks carried out in other social processes. The professional moral-political and psychological preparation of the personnel to defend the fatherland presupposes the development of special qualities in the men, which are required in a combat situation. In nature there are no military-technical mechanisms such as missiles, tanks and guns. Combat equipment, as a rule, is not employed in industry and agriculture. And the more complicated military equipment becomes, the more it differs from the equipment employed in the national economy. In line with this, special areas of science have arisen which, in having their roots in the area of the corresponding social, natural and technical sciences, interact closely with military science and are contiguous and bordering on it. Such an intertwining of sciences also occurs in other areas of knowledge. We might recall that there exist physical chemistry, chemical physics and so forth.

In a number of areas of knowledge there has been a trend where their military aspect becomes so complex and extended that, in keeping its ties with the base sciences, it is gradually turned into special areas of military knowledge, adjoining military science closely. To a definite degree this has already happened in military geography, military electronics, the automation of troop command and control, military pedagogy and psychology and certain other areas of military scientific knowledge. This is also characteristic of other sciences.

In the area of **socio-political sciences**, in addition to the Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army, of major significance for the armed forces are the science of party construction and its branch, the theory of party-political work in the armed forces, the theory of military law, military psychology, military pedagogy, military history and so forth.

The theory of party-political work, proceeding from the general scientific principles in the organizational development of the CPSU and in the remaining part of this social science, works out the questions of party-political work considering the specific features of the armed forces and armed combat. The forms and methods of political work by the commanders and political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations in a combat situation are completely different than under any other conditions and for this reason these questions can be profoundly worked out only on a basis of understanding the laws of armed combat and the principles of military art with the crucial importance of general party ideas.

Party political work plays a major role in preparing the Soviet Armed Forces to defend the socialist homeland. It encompasses all spheres of life, the combat training of the troop collectives, the daily activities of the political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations, the commanders and staffs. Under present-day conditions particularly great importance has been assumed by ideological work, since the moral-political and human factor is a most important element in the combat capability of the armed forces. Here it must be considered that the more significant the successes of the socialist countries demonstrating the triumph of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism the greater the subversion by the reactionary imperialist circles on the ideological front. And this is completely natural. In putting it in a military way, the enemy always throws its main forces where the main danger threatens it.

For this reason, in carrying out the party's instructions about a comprehensive approach to organizing upbringing work and combining ideological-patriotic, labor and moral upbringing of the Soviet people, the commanders, the political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations are focusing their efforts on providing a close link and unity in the processes of instruction, political and military upbringing, and on a decisive unmasking of the ideological subversion of the enemy. Particular attention has been paid to increasing vigilance and strengthening military discipline.

Military psychology, in being an area of the science of psychology, discloses the particular features of human psychology in the process of armed combat and brings out methods for disclosing a person's abilities to perform various types of military activity. These tasks cannot be carried out by other areas of the science of psychology.

Military pedagogy is an area of pedagogical science which studies the patterns of training and educating servicemen, the particular features of applying pedagogical principles and methods of instruction in the process of operational, combat and political training. Military pedagogy is closely linked to military science (the theory of military instruction and upbringing) and to the theory of party-political work in the armed forces.

Among the related sciences, a major role is played by military history which studies the history of wars, the history of the Armed Forces and military art, military historiography and military bibliographic sciences [istochnikovedeniya], military historical statistics and military archeology. As for the history of the armed forces and military art, this, in turn, includes the history of military science (military scientific thought), the history of strategy, operational art and tactics, the history of the organizational development of the armed forces, the history of the development of weapons and military equipment, the history of the military economy and rear services, the history of military training and education, that is, all those areas of practical military activity and military knowledge which are covered by the theory and practice of military affairs.

Being a part of general historical science, military history at the same time is directly connected to military science and such branches of it as the history of the armed forces and military art are component parts of military science. The latter has sometimes been disputed, but it is very difficult to agree with this. N.G. Chernyshevskiy said that without the history of a subject there is no theory of a subject and without the theory of a subject there is not even any idea of its history.⁽²⁰⁾ This is completely understandable. Many sciences organically include in themselves the history of their subject. For military science this is particularly important.

The conclusions of a science cannot be based solely upon an analysis of the present-day state of affairs. "...Not bare conclusions," said F. Engels, "but, conversely, study—this is what is needed most of all: conclusions are nothing without that development which led to them...."⁽²¹⁾

The path to understanding the laws of development of a science lies through the study of the history of the science and the subject of its investigation, since the development of a science at present and in the future is a natural continuation of previous historical development. The main task of any science is to understand the objective patterns of the investigated phenomena and this is only possible in examining them in their development. When the various states of one or another phenomenon in the past, present and future are examined in isolation, we have the opportunity to merely compare what was, what is and what will be, but we are unable to answer the main question of how one phenomenon arose from another and we are unable to disclose the mechanism of their ties

and relations. Historical work itself, if this is done abstractly, loses its sense: it should help in the skillful employment of previous experience for carrying out modern tasks.

The development of the military aspect in the area of natural sciences has led to the appearance of a whole series of such special military sciences as military geography, military cartography, military geodesy, military topography, military hydrometeorology, military navigation, military medical and other sciences the purpose of which are completely apparent.

In the area of the technical sciences, a number of branches of knowledge have appeared which could also be called military-technical sciences. Each of these has its particular features but as a whole they are linked by the elaboration of the following main problems: design and production of weapons; ways for the efficient use of the combat capabilities of weapons and military equipment; principles for the operation and repair of weapons. Here are such sciences as ballistics, theory of gunnery, communications, military electronics, military cybernetics, military engineering, military chemical and many other sciences. The appearance on the leading edges of military science, along with other sciences, of common problems a solution to which can be achieved within the limits of several areas of knowledge ensures a complete study of the problems of preparing and conducting armed combat considering the moral-political, socio-economic and scientific-technical factors and the more complete utilization of the achievements of all sciences for strengthening the defense capability of the Soviet state and for raising the combat might of its Armed Forces. The broadening and deepening of the ties of military science with the social, natural and technical sciences enriches not only its content but also the research methods. Particularly characteristic in this regard is the ever-broader introduction of system approach [sistemnogo podkhoda], heuristic, mathematical and other methods into military science.

Areas of science examining nonmilitary forms of combating the enemy. As was already mentioned, at the basis of all contradictions and conflicts giving rise to wars lie deep social roots and an entire complex of political, economic, ideological and military ties and relationships between classes and states and deriving from the social system and the political aims of a war. For this reason a war expresses not just any one contradiction but all sociopolitical and economic contradictions and the various forms of struggle deriving from them.

In the wars of the 20th Century, combat against an enemy encompassed both military conflict as well as directly economic, ideological and diplomatic forms of conflict. Although war was a continuation of politics by means of armed violence, this was the main but not the sole form of conflict against an enemy. As historical experience shows, during a war politics as a whole continues; here it employs all available methods and

forms of conflict. In actuality, as was shown by the Great Patriotic War, to achieve victory it was essential to mobilize all the forces and means existing in a state and to subordinate the entire life of the country and its scientific and technical achievements to the interests of the war.

While military science, along with the military aspect of related areas of other sciences, ensures the conduct of armed conflict, the other social and natural-technical sciences study different forms of conflict against the enemy and different state activities: ideological, economic, diplomatic, legal and so forth.

During a war, **ideological conflict** was of a particularly fierce nature. The moral and political factors played, for example, a decisive role in the victory of the Vietnamese people over American imperialism. Under present-day conditions, the clash of ideas and morale of peoples and armies is assuming ever-greater importance. This form of conflict also occurs in peacetime but is carried out by different methods and means. And in order to employ it effectively in repelling aggression, the corresponding areas of sciences should investigate and elaborate the problems of ideological conflict.

Economic conflict is carried out with the aim of ensuring economic superiority over the enemy. Under conditions of the employment of modern weapons, the economy of the belligerents can become an object of even stronger and more intense armed action.

Economic sciences investigate the specific functioning of a national economy in wartime. In particular, they elaborate recommendations on shifting the national economy from a peacetime status to a wartime one.

Diplomatic conflict in the course of a war has always played a significant role. V.I. Lenin said: "As long as war exists, secret diplomacy should exist as one of the means of war.... The assessment of this diplomacy depends on the over-all assessment of the war."⁽²²⁾ Diplomatic conflict has not lost its role under present-day conditions. It is aimed at strengthening the socialist coalition, the struggle for allies and the collapse of the enemy coalition in the event of imperialist aggression.

Thus, the philosophical-sociological, socio-political, economic, military and military-technical, legal, historical, psychological and pedagogical knowledge about war and the army comprise a definite system which is brought together by a unified methodological base, Marxism-Leninism.

From all that has been said it follows that a classification of the sciences is not an end in itself and a far from abstract question. It should serve as a theoretical basis for practical activities. For example, under the conditions of the existing threat of the start of a war by the imperialists, the interests of the matter demand that all the social, natural and technical sciences, along with

their other inherent tasks, be concerned with the questions of strengthening defense capability of the country. For this is a matter for all the party, for all the state and for all the people.

In this context posing the question that military science should be concerned with studying war as a whole or with the preparation of the entire country to repel aggression, in addition to its methodological falaciousness virtually contributes nothing to an integrated investigation of war with the involvement of other areas of sciences and does not focus them on carrying out the tasks of strengthening the country's defense capability. At the same time, a systems approach to studying war and the army by the joint efforts of many sciences will make it possible to understand them in all their completeness and diversity, to formulate an ordered system of categories, establish a more viable theory and formulate effective and concrete principles for practical activity.

The nomenclature approved by the State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers on Science and Technology in 1984 for the specialties of scientific workers in the area of military science and other social, natural and technical sciences was defined precisely from these positions.

A clear classification of scientific knowledge, which comprises the content of military science, makes it possible fundamentally to determine what areas of science upon the development of which we must concentrate primary attention in one or another stage in accord with practical requirements; to establish the leading organizations responsible for the development of the main areas of science, the organization and structure of scientific institutions; to provide a systemic approach to planning scientific research, having pooled the efforts of a number of scientific collectives for resolving the most complicated and pressing problems; to improve the curricula of the VUZes as well as the programs for operational and combat training in such a manner that the military cadres study all the main areas of military science and the military aspects of other sciences, thereby providing a prompt assimilation of scientific achievements.

Such an approach provides an opportunity to thoroughly and completely investigate the problems of war and peace in the modern age and with greater effectiveness to carry out the responsible and complex tasks of preventing war and ensuring the reliable defense of the country.

In light of what has been stated, military doctrine is not a separate area of science which independently investigates one or another problem. It selects the necessary data from the entire system of knowledge concerned with war and the army.

In theoretical terms, the sociopolitical aspect of military doctrine is based upon the Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army and on other social sciences; its military-technical aspect is based upon the theses of military science and the military aspect of other sciences.

The question is frequently raised of why, along with scientific knowledge (teachings about war and the army and military science), there is also military doctrine. The problem is that in military science various views can and should exist on the methods of carrying out one or another task. For a science this is completely admissible, as the clash of opinions encourages its development. But at a certain stage, doctrine takes the most effective views and reinforces them in official documents and regulations as obligatory guiding concepts for all. For example, with the appearance of nuclear weapons, the question was raised of what would be the main means of delivering them: missiles or aircraft. A correct solution to this question would determine the main focus in the organizational development and technical equipping of the Armed Forces and the methods of conducting operations. Certainly the appropriate orders were given to the defense industry proceeding from this. In such instances, without unified doctrinal views it is impossible to provide effective organizational development and preparation of the Armed Forces and the strengthening of the country's defense as a whole.

Military doctrine represents a system of official, fundamental views on the questions of the country's defense and these must be followed by military cadres. In accord with the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress, further efforts are required to develop military theory.

In examining the problems and prospects of military theory, it is essential to reemphasize that, under present-day conditions in analyzing all military questions, a greater role is to be played by Marxist-Leninist philosophy and all component parts of Marxism-Leninism. For this reason the investigation of the military theoretical heritage of V.I. Lenin remains a most important task, the questions of the activities of the CPSU in the area of strengthening the country's defense capability, Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army, the methodological problems of military theory and practice and the unmasking of ideological sabotage by anticommunism in the area of military theory and history.

The greater role played by military theory under present-day conditions is determined by the following major factors.

First of all, the problems of war and peace and the prevention of war have assumed crucial significance. Major changes have occurred and are occurring in the military-political situation and in the placement and correlation of world military-political forces. In this context the military-political factors of preventing war and carrying out defense tasks have become more complex.

The great dynamism of world processes, the complicated nature of relations between states and systems of states, the possibility, as a consequence of the increased aggressiveness of imperialism, of abrupt turns in the development of events and, consequently, the surprise exacerbation of the situation in various regions of the world, like other features of the present-day international situation, have a great influence on all aspects of military affairs. In this context at present there must be a new solution to many questions related to the organization of the defense of our country and the other countries of the socialist coalition, and the problems of protecting socialism against imperialist aggression must be viewed from different positions.

It is perfectly obvious that mistakes in these complicated questions are inadmissible. In order to avoid them, we must have an exceptionally precise, thoroughly scientifically based and strict assessment of many objective and subjective factors in the political and strategic situation as well as all the development trends in military affairs.

Certainly, in this work the conclusions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the party Central Committee concerning the fundamental problems of international relations, the degree and sources of military danger and the ways of preventing war and strengthening the country's defense under present-day conditions are decisively important.

In being guided by these conclusions, our military theory can and must provide sound forecasts of the origin and development of possible critical situations as well as work out specific ways to prevent war and to defend the socialist homeland.

The greater role played by military theory has been largely influenced by the new qualitative shift in the development of weapons and in the creation of new weapons and combat equipment of the next generation based upon the most recent scientific and technical achievements. In line with this, it is very important to work out scientifically sound forecasts, on the one hand, on the ways to prevent the enemy's military superiority and, on the other, how to ensure reliable defense with lower levels of military confrontation.

Finally, as the qualitative gap between the means of waging the last and future wars increases, there is the particularly urgent question of the scientific prediction and forecasting of the nature and methods of conducting armed combat. Here it is essential to consider the fact that in peacetime, military practice is comparatively limited and precisely military theory can and should most completely foresee future phenomena. Prediction is the main goal of any science.

All of this indicates that military theory has become one of the most important factors in strengthening national defense and in increasing the combat might of the armed

forces. From this stem new, higher demands on the organization, quality and effectiveness of military scientific work in the armed forces.

The fundamental, qualitative changes occurring in military affairs and the rapid pace of its development require the appropriate scope and higher pace of scientific work. In the past, when the material base of wars changed comparatively slowly, the scientific elaboration of certain problems took years.

Under present-day conditions the situation has changed fundamentally and a delay in working out urgent problems in military theory is fraught with severe consequences. The rapid replacement of weapons and equipment and the ensuing more frequent changes in the methods of conducting armed combat require a sharp rise in the intensity of scientific research, in the promptness of working out major problems and a wider front of military scientific work.

With such scope and the increased demands, the development of military theory can no longer be a matter of individual scientists. For the successful development of military science under present-day conditions, there must be the active involvement in military scientific work of a broad circle of generals, admirals and officers, and there must be well organized labor by large creative collectives employing computers and mathematical methods.

At present, the practical activities of all directorates, staffs, military educational institutions and military cadres should be organically combined and merged with scientific searches. Military scientific work cannot be viewed as something separate from service activities. It is a most important duty of all officials and without this it is impossible to successfully carry out the complex and responsible tasks confronting military theory.

Historical experience shows that as the methods of conducting combat operations [deystviy] develop, the troop training methods must also develop. Otherwise the most correct conclusions of theory remain unrealized. The question of the prompt introduction of military scientific achievements into the training and upbringing practices for the personnel as well as in troop leadership is particularly urgent.

On this question of primary importance is the well-thought out organization of military-scientific information, which would assure the timely provision of military-scientific achievements to the staffs, troops, fleets and schools.

In our time, not one of the most conscientious generals or officers is capable of encompassing the ever-growing flow of scientific information. At the same time, if something important is missed, it is impossible to fully

ensure a scientific level of solving the set tasks and as a result a gap can form between the development of science and its use in resolving specific practical tasks.

The introduction into practice of the most important scientific and technical achievements, like the generalization and dissemination of advanced experience and the examples of a creative and innovative solution to practical problems, is not a voluntary matter. This is the direct obligation of the commanders, the chiefs of staffs and the political bodies, the combat arms and services. It is their duty to carry out this task even more steadfastly and not only recommend various scientific achievements but supervise their introduction into the practical work and leadership of the troops.

For the training of cadres in accord with modern requirements we must have more active and effective methods of command training.

Of particularly great importance is the development of the qualities needed for the manifesting of military art: independence, decisiveness and so forth. However, these qualities do not appear automatically with the outbreak of a war, if they have not been developed day in and day out in peacetime.

A.S. Makarenko was correct when he said that "in order to indoctrinate courage in a man, it is essential to place him under conditions where he can demonstrate this courage." This applies also to other command qualities. Given the instructive conduct of exercises in accord with the demands of modern combat and operations [operatsii], conditions are created for creativity, for the development of new methods of conducting combat actions [deystviy] and for the furthest development of military science and military art.

The strength of the Soviet Armed Forces lies in their inseparable unity with the people. For a socialist state, such a link is completely natural and derives from the democratic nature of the Soviet Armed Forces which are vitally interested in strengthening the defense of their country and the combat might of the Army and Navy.

One of the most important lessons of the war was that only by the efforts of the entire people under the party's leadership is it possible to prepare and ensure victory in a modern war, if the imperialists succeed in unleashing it contrary to the interests of all mankind. The restructuring as outlined by the 27th CPSU Congress and presently being implemented in our country, and the profound socioeconomic, spiritual and cultural transformations occurring in Soviet society are of great significance for the further strengthening of the country's defense. The improvement in ideological-political and military patriotic education, in intellectual and physical development, the rise in the general educational and technical level of young people make it possible to achieve an even more profound understanding in the soldiers of their patriotic and military duty, the personal responsibility of each

Soviet citizen for the defense of the socialist motherland. The development of democracy, glasnost and the better moral climate in society give a deeper sense to the ideals of socialism which must be defended. Moreover, all these changes create favorable conditions for the more successful rapid mastery of a military specialty, of complicated military equipment and weapons and this helps to further raise the combat readiness of the Armed Forces.

In turn, military service is not only a school of military skill but also a school for ideological, practical and physical development, a school for the mastery of complex technical specialties, organization and discipline and this is very important as a whole for the communist upbringing of the Soviet people.

Our party views military-patriotic upbringing of the population as one of the important areas of ideological work. The party and soviet bodies, the Komsomol, trade union and other public organizations and the Civil Defense bodies carry out great and fruitful work in the area of educating the Soviet people in the heroic revolutionary, military and labor traditions, in a spirit of great vigilance and constant readiness to defend the victories of socialism. A significant contribution to military-patriotic work has been made by the mass defense organizations and DOSAAF, the activists of the all-union Znanie Society, the Soviet War Veterans Committee, the military-scientific societies at the officer clubs as well as the reserve and retired officers and generals.

In the entire system of mass defense work on the spot, a particularly important role is played by the military commissariats which must be at the center of this work, set the tone for it and see to it that in carrying out all the measures they most fully consider the interests of the Armed Forces and the defense of the motherland as a whole.

In the entire system of military-patriotic upbringing of the youth, of particular importance is teaching them a profound understanding of their military duty. At present, when the educational and cultural level of the youth is growing year by year, some thought must be given to increasing the demands placed upon the quality and persuasiveness of the lectures, reports, speeches, special-subject evenings and other measures.

In the area of upbringing work proper concern and in a number of instances also the required exactingness is not always shown for its effectiveness and results.

A comprehensive approach to upbringing presupposes that this question cannot be restricted to lectures, speeches, or meetings with war and labor heroes. Even when successfully held, such measures at best can evoke in others a desire to carry out their patriotic duty well and to be bold or disciplined, but they themselves do not acquire these qualities, just as it is impossible, for

example, to become a master of sports merely by listening to lectures on the importance of sports. The same thing can be said about the teaching of any other human qualities, particularly those related to preparation for service in the army. The hardening by labor and life, and in the ranks of the Armed Forces military upbringing, carried out in the course of combat training, and all the daily difficulties of troop service is of highest significance. But a basis for hardening in life should be established during the preparation of youth for military service.

It is necessary to bear in mind that the organizational development of the Armed Forces under present-day conditions is going on in a complex international situation. On the one hand, there is an ongoing struggle for peace and disarmament, and the idea of preventing war is gaining ever-greater persuasiveness and strength. On the other hand, the threat of war continues to exist. In such a dynamic and contradictory situation, an organic unity and successful solution to the dual task of strengthening peace and the country's defense capability assume certain new traits and become an ever more complicated matter.

Under these conditions, all work of preparing the youth for service in the Armed Forces and military-patriotic upbringing should be significantly deeper, sounder and more convincing.

In line with this, I would like to draw attention to the following circumstance. At times, our press and other mass information organs talk widely about measures to lessen tension and this is quite correct but at the same time they do not disclose with sufficient persuasiveness the aggressive essence of imperialism, its military preparations involving danger for the fate of socialism.

The difficulties of preventing the arms race even in the progressive press abroad and sometimes, unfortunately, in our country too, are frequently depicted in too simplified a manner, as some magic circle: as if we are arming because the NATO countries are doing this, and they intensify the arms race referring to us. Here the fundamental difference of our positions is not brought out. The assertions about the "equal responsibility" of capitalism and socialism for the development of military tension and the continuing arms race are fundamentally incorrect. The Soviet Union has constantly come forward with specific proposals to reduce weapons while the Western countries under every pretext have rejected them, endeavoring to gain unilateral advantages. It would be a good thing if this aspect of the question was disclosed with all persuasiveness to our Soviet people.

Of course, it is inadmissible when articles published in our press voice judgments on the desirability of our unilateral disarmament. The very necessity of the defense of the fatherland against imperialist aggression is placed in doubt and hence so is the military profession.

Unsound notions of the negative effect of military service on the creative abilities of the youth are disseminated. The true struggle for peace has nothing in common with such one-sided pacifist views. They have a negative impact upon the carrying out of defense tasks and play only into the hands of our ideological enemies.

In the context of the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, good opportunities are opened up for strengthening and further activating all our military-patriotic work. This significant jubilee is being widely employed to disclose the heroic past of our people, particularly with the aim of showing the decisive role of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces in defeating Nazi Germany and militaristic Japan and in propagandizing the heroism, valor and courage of the current defenders of the motherland.

All of this helps to educate the Soviet people in a spirit of loyalty to the Communist Party, revolutionary vigilance and a constant readiness to come to the defense of the victories of socialism.

As was pointed out by the USSR Minister of Defense, Army Gen D.T. Yazov, our efforts in the area of the defense of the country "...will be based upon the unwavering foundation of the Leninist teachings concerning the defense of the socialist fatherland. In the event of aggression, our Armed Forces together with the fraternal socialist armies will defend the achievements of socialism with all determination. The security of our country and the socialist commonwealth as a whole is a sacred concern for us." (23)

Footnotes

1. "Materialy XXVII syezda KPSS" [Materials of the 27th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1986, p 4.
2. V.I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 27, p 388.
3. "Materialy XXVII syezda....," p 136.
4. Ibid., p 11.
5. V.I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 40, p 244.
6. Ibid., Vol 38, p 50.

7. "Materialy XXVII syezda....," p 160.
8. V.I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 37, p 122.
9. *Pravda*, 30 May 1987.
10. M.S. Gorbachev, "Izbrannyye rechi i statii" [Selected Speeches and Articles], Moscow, 1985, p 60.
11. V.I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 40, p 152.
12. See: "Malaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya" Moscow, Vol 2, 1958, p 544; "Voyennaya strategiya", Moscow, 2d Edition, 1963 and so forth.
13. See: "Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya" [Great Soviet Encyclopedia], Moscow, 1975, pp 282-284.
14. See: "Spravochnik ofitsera" [Officer's Reference], Moscow, 1971, p 47.
15. See: "Marksizm-leninizm o voyne i armii" [Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army], Moscow, 5th Edition, 1968, p 346.
16. See: V.I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 18, pp 363-364.
17. See: Ibid., Vol 40, p 183.
18. "Materialy XXVII syezda....," p 161.
19. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], 2d Edition, Vol 20, p 565.
20. See: N.G. Chernyshevskiy, "Izbrannyye filosofskie sochineniya" [Selected Philosophical Works], Moscow, Vol 1, 1950, p 303.
21. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch.," Vol 1, p 585.
22. "Leninskiy sbornik" [Leninist Collection], Vol XXXVI, p 132.
23. *Pravda*, 27 July 1987.

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